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HAMDAN AND ITS AFTERMATH
"Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees"
The New York Times
June 30, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court on Thursday repudiated
the Bush administration's plan to put
Guantanamo detainees on trial before
military commissions, ruling broadly that
the commissions were unauthorized by
federal statute and violated international
law.
"The executive is bound to comply with the
rule of law that prevails in this jurisdiction,"
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the 5-
to-3 majority, said at the end of a 73-page
opinion that in sober tones shredded each of
the administration's arguments, including the
assertion that Congress had stripped the
court of jurisdiction to decide the case.
A principal flaw the court found in the
commissions was that the president had
established them without Congressional
authorization.
The decision was such a sweeping and
categorical defeat for the administration that
it left human rights lawyers who have
pressed this and other cases on behalf of
Guantanamo detainees almost speechless
with surprise and delight, using words like
"fantastic," "amazing" and "remarkable."
Michael Ratner, president of the Center for
Constitutional Rights, a public interest law
firm in New York that represents hundreds
of detainees, said, "It doesn't get any better."
President Bush said he planned to work with
Congress to "find a way forward," and there
were signs of bipartisan interest on Capitol
Hill in devising legislation that would
authorize revamped commissions intended
to withstand judicial scrutiny.
The ruling marked the most significant
setback yet for the administration's broad
expansions of presidential power.
The courtroom was, surprisingly, not full,
but among those in attendance there was no
doubt they were witnessing a historic event,
a defining moment in the ever-shifting
balance of power among branches of
government that ranked with the court's
order to President Richard M. Nixon in 1974
to turn over the Watergate tapes, or with the
court's rejection of President Harry S.
Truman's seizing of the nation's steel mills, a
1952 landmark decision from which Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy quoted at length.
Senator Arlen Specter, Republican of
Pennsylvania and chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, introduced a bill immediately
and said his committee would hold a hearing
on July 11, as soon as Congress returned
from the July 4 recess. Mr. Specter said the
administration had resisted his effort to
propose similar legislation as early as 2002.
Two Republican senators, Lindsey Graham
of South Carolina and Jon Kyl of Arizona,
said in a joint statement that they were
"disappointed" but that "we believe the
problems cited by the court can and should
be fixed."
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"Working together, Congress and the
administration can draft a fair, suitable and
constitutionally permissible tribunal statute,"
they added.
Both overseas and in the United States,
critics of the administration's detention
policies praised the decision and urged Mr.
Bush to take it as an occasion to shut down
the Guantanamo prison camp in Cuba.
"The ruling destroys one of the key pillars of
the Guantanamo system," said Gerald
Staberock, a director of the International
Commission of Jurists in Geneva.
"Guantanamo was built on the idea that
prisoners there have limited rights. There is
no longer that legal black hole."
The majority opinion by Justice Stevens and
a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy,
who also signed most of Justice Stevens's
opinion, indicated that finding a legislative
solution would not necessarily be easy. In an
important part of the ruling, the court held
that a provision of the Geneva Conventions
known as Common Article 3 applies to the
Guantanamo detainees and is enforceable in
federal court for their protection.
The provision requires humane treatment of
captured combatants and prohibits trials
except by "a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized
people."
The opinion made it clear that while this
provision does not necessarily require the
full range of protections of a civilian court
or a military court-martial, it does require
observance of protections for defendants
that are missing from the rules the
administration has issued for military
commissions. The flaws the court cited were
the failure to guarantee the defendant the
right to attend the trial and the prosecution's
ability under the rules to introduce hearsay
evidence, unswom testimony, and evidence
obtained through coercion.
Justice Stevens said the historical origin of
military commissions was in their use as a
"tribunal of necessity" under wartime
conditions. "Exigency lent the commission
its legitimacy," he said, "but did not further
justify the wholesale jettisoning of
procedural protections."
The majority opinion was joined by Justices
David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer, who wrote a concurring
opinion focusing on the role of Congress.
"The court's conclusion ultimately rests
upon a single ground: Congress has not
issued the executive a blank check," Justice
Breyer said.
The dissenters were Justices Clarence
Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Samuel A.
Alito Jr. Each wrote a dissenting opinion.
Justice Scalia focused on the jurisdictional
issue, arguing that Congress had stripped the
court of jurisdiction to proceed with this
case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184,
when it passed the Detainee Treatment Act
last December and provided that "no court,
justice, or judge" had jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus petitions filed by detainees at
Guantanamo Bay.
The question was whether that withdrawal
of jurisdiction applied to pending cases. The
majority held that it did not.
Justice Thomas's dissent addressed the
substance of the court's conclusions. In a
part of his opinion that Justices Scalia and
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Alito also signed, he called the decision
"untenable" and "dangerous." He said "those
justices who today disregard the commander
in chiefs wartime decisions" had last week
been willing to defer to the judgment of the
Army Corps of Engineers in a Clean Water
Act case. "It goes without saying that there
is much more at stake here than storm
drains," he said.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. did not
take part in the case. Last July, four days
before Mr. Bush nominated him to the
Supreme Court, he was one of the members
of a three-judge panel of the federal appeals
court here that ruled for the administration
in the case.
In the courtroom on Thursday, the chief
justice sat silently in his center chair as
Justice Stevens, sitting to his immediate
right as the senior associate justice, read
from the majority opinion. It made for a
striking tableau on the final day of the first
term of the Roberts court: the young chief
justice, observing his work of just a year
earlier taken apart point by point by the
tenacious 86-year-old Justice Stevens,
winner of a Bronze Star for his service as a
Navy officer in World War II.
The decision came in an appeal brought on
behalf of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni
who was captured in Afghanistan in
November 2001 and taken to Guantanamo in
June 2002. According to the government,
Mr. Hamdan was a driver and bodyguard for
Osama bin Laden. In July 2003, he and five
others were to be the first to face trial by
military commission. But it was not until the
next year that he was formally charged with
a crime, conspiracy.
The commission proceeding began but was
interrupted when the federal district court
here ruled in November 2004 that the
commission was invalid. This was the ruling
the federal appeals court, with Judge
Roberts participating, overturned.
Lt. Cmdr. Charles Swift, Mr. Hamdan's
Navy lawyer, told The Associated Press that
he had informed his client about the ruling
by telephone. "I think he was awe-struck
that the court would rule for him, and give a
little man like him an equal chance,"
Commander Swift said. "Where he's from,
that is not true."
The decision contained unwelcome
implications, from the administration's point
of view, for other legal battles, some with
equal or greater importance than the fate of
the military commissions.
For example, in finding that the federal
courts still have jurisdiction to hear cases
filed before this year by detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, the justices put back on
track for decision a dozen cases in the lower
courts here that challenge basic rules and
procedures governing life for the hundreds
of people confined at the United States naval
base there.
In ruling that the Congressional
"authorization for the use of military force,"
passed in the days immediately after the
Sept. 11 attacks, cannot be interpreted to
legitimize the military commissions, the
ruling poses a direct challenge to the
administration's legal justification for its
secret wiretapping program.
Representative Adam Schiff, a California
Democrat who has also introduced a bill
with procedures for trying the Guantanamo
detainees, said the court's refusal to give an
open-ended ruling to the force resolution
meant that the resolution could not be
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viewed as authorizing the National Security
Agency's domestic wiretapping.
Perhaps most significantly, in ruling that
Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions applies to the Guantanamo
detainees, the court rejected the
administration's view that the article does
not cover followers of Al Qaeda. The
decision potentially opened the door to
challenges, by those held by the United
States anywhere in the world, to treatment
that could be regarded under the provision
as inhumane.
Justice Stevens said that because the charge
against Mr. Hamdan, conspiracy, was not a
violation of the law of war, it could not be
the basis for a trial before a military panel.
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The Supreme Court yesterday struck down
the military commissions President Bush
established to try suspected members of al-
Qaeda, emphatically rejecting a signature
Bush anti-terrorism measure and the broad
assertion of executive power upon which the
president had based it.
Brushing aside administration pleas not to
second-guess the commander in chief during
wartime, a five-justice majority ruled that
the commissions, which were outlined by
Bush in a military order on Nov. 13, 2001,
were neither authorized by federal law nor
required by military necessity, and ran afoul
of the Geneva Conventions.
As a result, no military commission can try
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the former aide to
Osama bin Laden whose case was before the
justices, or anyone else, unless the president
does one of two things he has resisted doing
for more than four years: operate the
commissions by the rules of regular military
courts-martial, or ask Congress for specific
permission to proceed differently.
"[I]n undertaking to try Hamdan and subject
him to criminal punishment, the Executive is
bound to comply with the Rule of Law that
prevails in this jurisdiction," Justice John
Paul Stevens wrote in the majority opinion.
While the decision addressed only military
commissions, legal analysts said its skeptical
view of presidential power could be applied
to other areas such as warrantless
wiretapping, and that its invocation of the
Geneva Conventions could pave the way for
new legal claims by detainees held at the
military facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The ruling shifts the spotlight to Congress,
whose members face reelection this fall and
who have largely avoided the military
commission issue since the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks because of its political uncertainties.
The invitation for the president to turn to
Congress was extended in a short concurring
opinion by one of the justices in the
majority, Stephen G. Breyer, who made it
clear that the concerns of critics had
penetrated deeply at the court.
"Where, as here, no emergency prevents
consultation with Congress, judicial
insistence upon that consultation does not
weaken our Nation's ability to deal with
danger. To the contrary, that insistence
strengthens the Nation's ability to
determine-through democratic means-
how best to do so," Breyer wrote.
"The Constitution places its faith in those
democratic means," Breyer concluded. "Our
Court today simply does the same."
Joining Stevens and Breyer in the majority
were Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David
H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Perhaps the only silver lining for the
administration was that the decision did not
affect the government's authority to keep
terrorism suspects at Guantanamo Bay or
elsewhere, a point Bush emphasized in his
reaction. "We take the findings seriously,"
he said. "The American people need to
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know that this ruling, as I understand it,
won't cause killers to be put out on the
street."
But the court's action was clearly a setback
for the White House. At the high court, its
approach to the war on terrorism has
suffered the broadest in a series of defeats,
and the administration has been sent back to
the drawing board in dealing with hundreds
of suspected members of the Taliban and al-
Qaeda-at a time when international
pressure is mounting to shut down
Guantanamo Bay.
This is not the situation the president
envisioned when he unveiled the military
commissions as a tough-minded alternative
to the civilian trials that the Clinton
administration had used against terrorists.
As first outlined in 2001, the commissions
did not give defendants a presumption of
innocence or guarantee a public trial.
Yet the swift and certain punishment that
supporters of the commissions expected has
not materialized. The commissions quickly
became mired in questions about what many
saw as their lack of due process for
defendants, and about the unilateral way in
which Bush had created them.
Though the Defense Department has
modified commission procedures in favor of
the accused, military and civilian lawyers
continue to object that defendants have no
right to be present for the entire trial or to
see all of the evidence against them. While
14 of the 490 terrorism suspects at
Guantanamo Bay have been designated for
trial, not a single case has been decided.
Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
and Samuel A. Alito Jr. dissented. Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr. did not
participate because he served on the three-
judge appeals court panel whose ruling
upholding the commissions was under
review.
Scalia and Thomas read their dissents from
the bench, a demonstration of their strong
disapproval of the court's decision. Scalia
argued that the court should have stayed out
of the case because of a law Congress
passed late last year circumscribing the
appeal rights of military commission
defendants.
Thomas said the majority "openly flouts our
well-established duty to respect the
Executive's judgment in matters of military
operations and foreign affairs."
But center stage at yesterday's dramatic
session belonged to Stevens, the 86-year-old
World War II veteran who served as a Navy
officer and a Supreme Court law clerk
during the late 1940s, the last time the
United States made extensive use of military
commissions.
Though Stevens, the most liberal member of
the court, has sometimes employed sharp
rhetoric against the Bush administration in
other cases, he read a summary of his 73-
page opinion yesterday in a somber,
seemingly deliberately low-key manner. The
written version seemed designed to pick
apart the Bush case for the commissions
rather than denounce it.
Stevens ruled that the court had jurisdiction,
rejecting the administration's argument that
it had been ousted from the case by the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. That law,
even though it blocked habeas corpus
petitions by Guantanamo Bay prisoners and
shifted all appeals regarding military
tribunals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, did not
clearly state that it was meant to apply
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retroactively to Hamdan and others, Stevens
wrote.
At the heart of Stevens's reasoning was the
observation that an existing statute, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
already prescribes broad rules for military
commissions, saying that their procedures
must track those of courts-martial unless that
is impractical.
But the administration's commissions,
Stevens noted, do not meet this standard
because they deprive defendants of
protections that are basic to the courts-
martial. The administration had cited special
dangers involved in fighting terrorism, but
Stevens concluded that "nothing in the
record before us demonstrates that it would
be impracticable to apply court-martial rules
in this case."
Additionally, Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, a provision that
guarantees "minimum" protections for
detainees, applies to the war against al-
Qaeda, and is thus a part of the "law of war,"
Stevens wrote.
This means that terrorism suspects benefit
from Common Article 3's prohibition
against trials by anything other than "a
regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples."
Because they were not properly authorized
by Congress and do not match court-martial
rules, Bush's military commissions do not
qualify, Stevens wrote.
The court's opinion embraced a role for
international humanitarian law that the
administration has repeatedly rejected.
"The court seems to be saying that the war
on terrorism at least in some regards is
governed by Common Article 3," said
Michael J. Glennon, a professor of
international law at Tufts University. "That's
an important step."
Legal analysts said that the court's opinion
could lead to a challenge to the National
Security Agency's domestic surveillance
program, because wiretapping is already
covered by a federal statute, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, just as
military commissions were, in the court's
view, covered by the UCMJ.
"The same reasoning would seem to apply to
the NSA case, because the argument that the
authorization to use military force enables
them to ignore FISA goes down the drain,"
said Joseph P. Onek, senior counsel of the
Constitution Project, a Washington-based
civil liberties organization that opposed the
commissions.
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WASHINGTON-A federal appeals court
granted a Bush administration request to
make more legal arguments over the fate of
hundreds of lawsuits filed by detainees held
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
A three-judge panel set a schedule for
lawyers for the government and the
detainees to provide their views in writing
over the next few weeks about the impact of
the Supreme Court's ruling in June in the
case of Osama bin Laden's driver.
In a rebuke of President Bush, the Supreme
Court ruled 5-3 that his plan to hold criminal
trials before military tribunals for some of
the Guantanamo detainees violates U.S. and
international law.
"It's distressing," said detainee lawyer
Thomas B. Wilner, who opposed the
government's request for another round of
briefing on the issue. "This case has now
been pending for two years."
The order filed Wednesday means there will
be a rare fourth round of legal filings to
determine the fate of lawsuits that detainees
filed challenging the legality of their
detentions.
The justices, in the June ruling on bin
Laden's driver, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, also
said a law passed by Congress late last year
to limit lawsuits filed by Guantanamo
detainees does not apply to pending cases
like that of Hamdan.
By the time the law was passed in
December, civil cases had been filed on
behalf of hundreds of detainees.
In 2004, the Supreme Court said detainees
can challenge the legality of their detentions.
Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act
to limit those lawsuits and to set up a
process for detainees to challenge their
designations as "enemy combatants."
The three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has already heard arguments twice _ in
September 2005 and in March _ in appeals
filed by both sides challenging conflicting
rulings by trial judges on whether the
lawsuits can proceed.
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A PRESIDENT responds to an
unprecedented war with unprecedented
measures that test the limits of his
constitutional authority. He suffers setbacks
from hostile Supreme Court justices, a
critical media and a divided Congress, all of
which challenge his war powers.
Liberal pundits and editorial pages would
have you believe this describes President
Bush after the Supreme Court last week
rejected military commissions for trying
terrorists. But it just as easily fits Abraham
Lincoln when he issued the Emancipation
Proclamation freeing the slaves or Franklin
D. Roosevelt when he made the United
States the great "arsenal of democracy" in
the lead-up to World War II.
The court's decision in Hamdan vs.
Rumsfeld ignores the basic workings of our
separation of powers and will hamper the
ability of future presidents to respond to
emergencies with the forcefulness and
vision of a Lincoln or an FDR.
Long-standing U.S. practice recognizes that
the president, as commander in chief, plays
the leading role in wartime. Presidents have
started wars without congressional
authorization, and they have exercised
complete control over military strategy and
tactics. They can act with a speed, unity and
secrecy that the other branches of
government cannot match. By contrast,
legislatures are large, diffuse and slow.
Their collective design may make them
better for deliberating over policy, but at the
cost of delay and lack of resolve.
The Sept. 11 attacks succeeded in part
because our government was mired in a
terrorism-as-crime approach that worried
less about preventing attacks than about
hypothetical threats to civil liberties-hence
the "wall" preventing our law enforcement
and intelligence agencies from sharing
information. Our laws considered war as
conflict only between nations and failed to
anticipate the rise of non-state terrorist
organizations that could kill 3,000
Americans, destroy the World Trade Center
and damage the Pentagon in a single day.
Bush invoked his constitutional authority to
fight this shadowy enemy that does not wear
uniforms, targets civilians and violates every
rule of civilized warfare. Like George
Washington, Andrew Jackson, Lincoln and
FDR, Bush established military
commissions to try enemy combatants for
war crimes. If the commander in chief
couldn't have taken wartime actions on his
own, then the slaves would have remained
Confederate property during the Civil War
and Britain would not have fully benefited
from American aid and military support
before World War II.
As an official in the Bush administration's
Justice Department from 2001 to 2003, I
argued that the president had the
constitutional power to act, alone if
necessary, to defend the country from
another attack. I helped shape the legal
policies--one of which the Supreme Court
has now blocked-giving him the flexibility
to wage a successful war on terrorism.
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Wartime decisions, which often must be
made under pressure of time and unique
circumstances, do not always fit the general
rules passed beforehand by legislatures. War
is dangerous and unpredictable and best
handled by a president who can act with
"decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch," in
the words of the Federalist Papers.
Congress has an important role but one
exaggerated by critics of the war on
terrorism. It could easily have blocked any
aspect of the administration's terrorism
policies simply by removing funding or
political support. It could have closed
Guantanamo Bay in a day, if it wished.
Instead, it authorized the president to use all
necessary and appropriate force against any
individual, organization or state connected
to the 9/11 attacks. Then, following past
practices, it sat back and let the president
handle the details and assume the political
risks. Critics seem to believe that Bush's
policies are at odds with the Republican
Congress. They are not.
What makes this war different is not that the
president acted while Congress watched but
that the Supreme Court interfered while
fighting was ongoing. Given its seizure of
control over some of society's most
contentious issues, such as abortion,
affirmative action and religion, maybe the
court's intervention should come as no
surprise. But its effort to inject the Geneva
Convention into the war on terrorism-even
though the treaties do not include
international conflict with non-states that
violate every rule of civilized warfare-
smacks of judicial micromanagement. The
Supreme Court has never before imposed its
preferred interpretation of a treaty governing
warfare on the president during war, and
Geneva has never been understood to give
enemy combatants rights in our courts.
The court displays a lack of judicial restraint
that would have shocked its predecessors. In
World War II, the Supreme Court
established precedents directly to the
contrary. To evade these previous rulings,
the court misread a law ordering it not to
decide Guantanamo Bay cases, narrowed the
very same authorization to use military force
that it had read broadly just two years ago,
ignored centuries of practice by presidents
and Congress on military commissions and
intruded into the executive's traditional
national security prerogatives. Justices used
to appreciate the inherent uncertainties and
dire circumstances of war, and the limits of
their own abilities. No longer.
But here, unlike abortion, the Supreme
Court does not have the last word. Congress
and the president can enact a simple law
putting the court back in its traditional place,
allowing for the usual combination of
presidential initiative and general
congressional support. There is no other way







Today the Senate begins hearings on
whether to create, from scratch, a new legal
system to handle the cases against suspected
terrorists held at Guantanamo Bay and
around the world. The hearings are a
response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court decision that last month
struck down President Bush's fake trial
system at Guantanamo. This debate is
important, and long overdue, but it should
not obscure the fact that the military already
has a battle-tested system for dealing with
such problems: courts-martial. We should
only break from that proud American
tradition for the best of reasons and with
adequate empirical support. There are no
such grounds here, and changing the rules
now will be another fruitless step backward
from our goal of bringing terrorists to
justice.
Ever since the morning of June 29, when the
Supreme Court announced its decision in
Hamdan (I argued the case in the Supreme
Court), I've received dozens of inquiries
asking how it feels to be vindicated after
five years of battling the military courts at
Guantanamo. I testified at the first Senate
hearing on the issue in November of 2001,
and I concluded then that President Bush's
then-two-week-old decision to adopt
military commissions to try the detainees
was flatly illegal. The ultimate result, I said
at that time, would be reversal by the courts
with no convictions.
So, I'd be lying if I said it didn't feel good,
five years later, to have predicted the result
in Hamdan. I've also learned, though, that I
was wrong about one particular point back
then: The fallback is not always a civilian
trial. Instead of wasting its time resuscitating
Bush's failed commissions, Congress should
now do what it failed to do in 2001: Look
seriously at the option of using courts-
martial to try terrorists.
In 2001, I knew squat about the existing
military-justice system. The debate at that
time simply pitted civilian courts against the
new Bush military commissions, with no
other alternative considered. Civilian trials,
with the heavy protections they afford
criminal defendants and witnesses, pose
risks to security, and if the administration
wanted to make changes to that system, I
testified that Congress had to authorize
them. I believed then that the career officials
in the departments of Defense and Justice
had considered, and rejected, other
alternatives to civilian justice before
resorting to the drastic step of creating new
commissions through presidential decree.
But the civilians running the new tribunal
process cut out those individuals who best
understood the laws of war including the
judge advocates general. There is no
evidence that they even thought about using
courts-martial, despite the fact that a statute
on the books since World War I allows
court-martial trials to punish terrorism.
It is not entirely surprising that they had a
legal blind spot. Military law used to be a
popular course a half-century ago in law
schools, yet today many leading schools do
not even offer it. The result is a deep bias
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against military law as well as civilians who
think to the extent they think about it at all
that the Uniform Code of Military Justice is
a backwater system in which anything goes.
I've spent the last four years learning the
truth. In 1950, Congress' adoption of the
UCMJ revolutionized military law. It built a
system based on fundamental respect for our
nation's traditions as well as international
law. The result was a military-justice system
that is the envy of the world.
Some pundits, in the wake of the Hamdan
decision, seized upon various purported
problems with courts-martial and urged
rushed legislationthe discussion of which
began in earnest today in the hearings. But
as I argued once in Slate, signing off on such
a new court system would still be a grave
mistake for three basic reasons.
First, the existing court-martial system is
already tooled up to handle terrorism cases.
We've had courts-martial on the battlefields
of Afghanistan and Iraq. The "jury" hearing
terrorism cases all have security clearances.
Military rules already permit closure of the
courtroom for sensitive national-security
information, authorize trials on secure
military bases far from civilians, enable
substitutions of classified information by the
prosecution, permit withholding of
witnesses' identities, and the like. The
UCMJ, in short, has flexible rules in place
that permit trials under unique
circumstances, and there is no reason to
think that they cannot handle these cases
today.
Moreover, a court-martial is a decidedly
legal proceeding. Congress already has
substantial law on the books authorizing and
governing them. The Supreme Court has on
countless occasions recognized and affirmed
such proceedings. And they satisfy all the
conditions the Hamdan majority found the
president's commissions failed to meet.
By using an existing system, we would not
just be reaffirming our core American
values, we'd also get better prosecutions.
Right now, England refuses to recognize the
commission system, with its attorney
general calling them completely
"unacceptable" because they fail to offer
"sufficient guarantees of a fair trial in
accordance with international standards."
Australia has cut a special side deal with the
Bush administration so one of its citizens,
David Hicks, is treated differently from
other commission defendants. A United
Nations Expert Committee says these
commissions are fundamentally unfair. This
report may prompt other nations to refuse to
let their citizens be tried in these bodies.
And extradition, sharing of
prosecution/intelligence information, and
availability of witnesses will all become
extremely serious problems when other
countries refuse to cooperate. Without an
extensive track record showing that courts-
martial are failures, it is exceptionally
dangerous to gamble our prosecution
strategy on the administration's diplomatic
ability to persuade other nations to cooperate
with these commissions.
Second, whatever purported benefits might
be gained by some new system have to be
weighed against the inevitable litigation risk.
The Hamdan decision makes clear that any
changes that depart from our nation's
military tradition and international law are
going to be closely scrutinized by the courts.
The result of changing the rules again now
will be another four years with no
prosecutions and perhaps yet another
reversal in the Supreme Court. "Four more
years" is not a convincing slogan, especially
when not a single terrorist has been brought
to justice in these military commissions.
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Only about 10 individuals were ever even
indicted and those indictments took nearly
three years to prepare.
Some clever Republicans are trying to get
around that problem by legislating an
"abstention" rule providing that challenges
to the new system can take place only after
someone had their trial, not before it. This
was the president's main position in the
Hamdan case, as well that Hamdan could
not challenge his commission until he was
convicted. Anyone, in Congress or the
courts, who advances that ludicrous notion
should be particularly ignored today. Can
you imagine if that advice were followed?
We'd have had each terrorist trial take place
under the president's system, and then, years
later, the Supreme Court would have had to
reverse all the convictions when they finally
got to decide Hamdan. A terrible result, for
the nation and for justice. All these
convicted terrorists would face freedom if
they could not be retried in some other
system.
Instead of abstention, any legislation enacted
today should make clear that it would
immediately authorize a challenge to a
three-judge district court and subsequent
appeal to the Supreme Court. It's time to get
this show on the road, folks. The
administration's "wait and see" attitude
toward criminal convictions of terrorists is
not something that can wait any longer.
Third, the Supreme Court got it right. The
president's military commissions departed in
every way from the most basic tenets of
American justice. For the first time,
defendants were kicked out of their own
criminal trials without their consent. Even a
military commission prosecutor called the
system "a half-hearted and disorganized
effort by a skeleton group of relatively
inexperienced attorneys to prosecute fairly
low-level accused in a process that appears
to be rigged." Another prosecutor lamented
that "writing a motion saying that the
process will be full and fair when you don't
really believe it is kind of hard particularly
when you want to call yourself an officer
and a lawyer."
Indeed, something that has gone without
notice thus far is that every judicial opinion
to side with Mr. Hamdan has been penned
by a jurist who actually served in our
military: Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, and lower court Judge
James Robertson. A coincidence perhaps,
but unlikely. For years, the military has
stood at the forefront of protecting the rule
of law, knowing that if our courts give the
executive branch the power to break from
the Geneva Conventions, then executives
from other countries will do it back to our
own troops some day when they are
captured.
For that reason, and despite all the
administration huffing and puffing about the
court's Geneva Conventions holding, the
Pentagon quietly last Friday issued a memo
agreeing with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Conventions and
finding that Common Article 3, the
provision at issue in Hamdan, now protects
detainees across the globe.
Justice Stevens' opinion in Hamdan put it
simply, "Nothing in the record before us
demonstrates that it would be impracticable
to apply court-martial rules in this case." I
would have thought that, upon hearing those
words and from a five-justice majority
composed of three Republican appointees
the president's reaction would have been to
ponder the oath he took to uphold the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
Instead, the administration treated this most
77
serious of matters as yet another political
game, with Bush going so far last Friday as
to absurdly declare that the Hamdan justices
"accepted the use of Guantanamo, the
decision I made" with respect to detaining
individuals there. That statement was
particularly odd, since the Solicitor
General's Office and I had both represented
to the court that detentions were not at issue
in the case, and the court itself made that
fact clear.
When the president spins a Supreme Court
opinion in this way, i.e., badly, you have to
wonder what else is being spun. Bush's
latest statement confirms my hunch that, like
a college boy around the tempting Jessica
Alba, whenever this administration gets near
Guantanamo, they cease to think rationally.
These folks cannot be trusted to run a new
prosecution system. It's time for tough and
fair justice, military-style. And that means
the system we already have.
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President Bush entered office intending to
enfeeble congressional or judicial checks on
executive authority. The legal theory
concocted was that the Constitution erected
a "unitary executive" free from restraint or
superintendence by coequal branches in
exercising executive power.
Accordingly, Congress was powerless to
regulate either the gathering of foreign
intelligence, or the use of military force
abroad, or the tribunals to adjudicate war
crimes. The Supreme Court was powerless
to review the president's indefinite
detentions of U.S. citizens as alleged illegal
combatants. And the president was
empowered to operate a perpetual secret
government to fight international terrorism,
unaccountable either to Congress or the
people or the law. In sum, Mr. Bush's
ambition was to conflate Inauguration with
coronation.
But by a 5-3 vote, the Supreme Court
repudiated that regal ambition in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld (June 29, 2006). The unitary
executive theory collapsed like a deck of
cards. The high court lectured Mr. Bush like
a schoolboy on constitutional checks and
balances, and on the dangers of an
omnipotent chief executive. The court
further discredited President Bush's claim
that Congress' Joint Resolution Authorizing
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) after the
September 11 terrorist attacks crowned him
with power to flout sister statutes or treaties.
It held both prohibited Mr. Bush's creation
of military commissions authorized to return
guilty verdicts for alleged war crimes based
on secret evidence. The court lectured that
Mr. Bush should ask Congress to amend the
law or override the Geneva Convention if he
wanted a military commission alternative to
customary courts-martial.
Hamdan removes any veneer of legality
from President Bush's warrantless domestic
surveillance program in contravention of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA). It also rejects the president's
authority to torture or otherwise maltreat
detainees to gather foreign intelligence in
violation of the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005. And the Supreme Court's precedent
denies the president's assertion that
Congress is helpless to regulate use of
military force, an insistence which has
repeatedly been made in presidential signing
statements for the Intelligence Authorization
Act. Like President Richard M. Nixon
before him, Mr. Bush's craving for an
imperial presidency will likely bring the
office to its ebb.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo taught that the
great tides and events that affect the rest of
men do not pass Supreme Court justices idly
by. They generally read newspapers, listen
to radio and watch television. They are
influenced by extrajudicial evidence of
government abuses or overreaching. Nixon
lost the Pentagon Papers and Nixon Tapes
cases less from constitutional logic than
from the Supreme Court's conviction Nixon
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was an untrustworthy and dangerous
custodian of the presidency. Franklin
Roosevelt was rebuked in Schechter Poultry
and Humphrey's Executor primarily because
the justices perceived a threat of executive
omnipotence reminiscent of Adolf Hitler
and Benito Mussolini.
Hamdan was born of a corresponding
Supreme Court concern: namely, that
President Bush is systemically seeking to
dismantle the Constitution's checks and
balances under an extravagant unitary
executive theory.
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a
plurality, categorically denied the president
could exclude Congress from any role in
punishing alleged war crimes or otherwise
confronting wartime dangers:
"Emergency alone .. will not justify the
establishment and use of penal tribunals not
contemplated by Article I, section 8 and
Article III, section 1 of the Constitution
unless some other part of that document
authorizes a response to the felt need. .. And
that authority, if it exists, can derive only
from powers granted jointly to the president
and Congress in time of war.
"The Constitution makes the President the
'Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
.. but vests in Congress the powers to
'declare War .. and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water' .. to 'raise and
support Armies' .. to 'define and punish ..
Offenses against the Law of Nations' .. and
'To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.' "
Congress further enjoys authority under the
"Necessary and Proper" Clause of Article I,
section 8 to regulate power the Constitution
entrusts to the president. Accordingly, the
president must partner with Congress in
waging war instead of holding the legislative
branch in vassalage.
Justice Stephen Breyer, in a concurring
opinion, lectured: "Where, as here, no
emergency prevents consultation with
Congress, judicial insistence on that
consultation [to establish a military
commission] does not weaken our nation's
ability to deal with danger. To the contrary,
that insistence strengthens the nation's
ability to determine through democratic
means how best to do so. The Constitution
places its faith in those democratic means."
Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a companion
concurrence, added: "Concentration of
power puts personal liberty in peril of
arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the
Constitution's three-part system is designed
to avoid."
Mr. Bush, however, will ignore the clear
lesson of Hamdan and recklessly press
forward with his unitary executive theory.
He will blame congressional or judicial
critics as weak on terror and national
security. The rule of law, he will insinuate,
is unacceptable in a post-September 11
world. But Mr. Bush will be repudiated by
Congress, the courts, and the American
people. He will leave the White House with
fewer powers than when he entered.
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"The Court Enters The War, Loudly"
The New York Times
July 2, 2006
Adam Liptak
JOHN C. YOO, a principal architect of the
Bush administration's legal response to the
terrorist threat, sounded perplexed and a
little bitter on Thursday afternoon. A few
hours earlier, the Supreme Court had
methodically dismantled the legal
framework that he and a few other
administration lawyers had built after the
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
"What the court is doing is attempting to
suppress creative thinking," said Professor
Yoo, who now teaches law at the University
of California, Berkeley. "The court has just
declared that it's going to be very intrusive
in the war on terror. They're saying, 'We're
going to treat this more like the way we
supervise the criminal justice system.'"
While in the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel from 2001 to 2003, Mr. Yoo
helped write a series of memorandums
setting out a bold and novel legal strategy to
find, hold, question and punish the nation's
enemies. The memorandums said the
Geneva Conventions do not apply to people
the administration designates as enemy
combatants. They contemplated the use of
highly coercive interrogation techniques.
They justified secret surveillance.
The court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
Professor Yoo said, may signal the collapse
of the entire enterprise. "It could affect
detention conditions, interrogation methods,
the use of force," he said. "It could affect
every aspect of the war on terror."
He was not overstating his case. True, the
decision itself-holding that the government
could not try detainees held at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, for war crimes in a particular
way-was narrow, given that it directly
affected only 10 men and did not address the
administration's broader contention that it
can hold those men and hundreds of others
without charges forever. And Congress may
yet put some or all of the president's
programs on firmer legal footing.
But the effect of the decision, constitutional
lawyers across the political spectrum agreed,
could devastate the administration's main
legal justifications for its campaign against
the terrorist threat.
"The mood music of this opinion so lacks
the traditional deference to the president,"
said John 0. McGinnis, who served in the
Justice Department from 1987 to 1991 and
now teaches law at Northwestern, "that it
would seem to have implications for his
other programs."
The administration had built its case in part
on a vote by Congress, taken a week after
Sept. 11, that authorized the president to
"use all necessary and appropriate force"
against those who participated in and
supported the attacks. The administration
has relied on that authorization as legal
support for several of its programs.
In 2004, the Supreme Court endorsed a part
of this argument, but Justice John Paul
Stevens, writing for the majority in Hamdan,
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was having none of it. There is, he said
"nothing in the text or legislative history" of
the authorization "even hinting that
Congress intended to expand or alter"
existing laws concerning military trials.
The opinion, Professor Yoo said, seemed to
require Congress to specify a laundry list of
powers before the president can act.
"I worked on the authorization," he added.
"We wrote it as broadly as possible. In past
wars, the court used to let the president and
Congress figure out how to wage the war.
That's very different from what's happening
today. The court said, 'If you want to do
anything, you have to be very specific and
precise about it.'"
The logic of the ruling and its requirement
that Congress directly authorize presidential
actions even in wartime has broad
implications. For one thing, said Laurence
H. Tribe, a law professor at Harvard, it
seems to destroy the administration's
argument that Congress blessed the National
Security Agency's domestic surveillance
program when it voted for the authorization.
"That argument is blown out of the water
and is obliterated," Professor Tribe said.
Justice Stevens also took aim at the
administration's chief constitutional
argument, the one that critics call "Article II
on steroids."
Because Article II of the Constitution,
among other things, anoints the president as
commander in chief, Professor Yoo and
other administration lawyers have argued the
president can ignore or override laws that
seem to limit his authority to conduct war. In
the current struggle against terrorism, they
argue, the entire world is the battlefield.
Perhaps not any more. Steven G. Calabresi,
a law professor at Northwestern and a
founder of the Federalist Society, the
conservative legal group, said this second
argument is also in trouble.
"The court is certainly not embracing the
broader Article II power," he said.
Indeed, a footnote in the majority opinion,
one sure to be read closely, seems tailored to
address these other controversies by
rejecting the argument that the president is
free to ignore Congressional limitations on
his power.
"Conceivably the court had in mind
controversies like the N.S.A. terrorist
surveillance program" in crafting the
footnote, said Curtis A. Bradley, a former
Bush administration lawyer who now
teaches law at Duke.
There are supporters of the N.S.A. program
who say that the Hamdan decision does not
affect it. They note that a 2002 appeals court
decision said that Congress "could not
encroach on the president's constitutional
power" to conduct warrantless surveillance
to obtain foreign intelligence.
The wholesale rejection of the
administration's positions in Hamdan may
have its roots in part in judicial hostility
toward the memorandums Professor Yoo
helped prepare several years ago. The
justices in the majority, said Professor
McGinnis, "have been so skeptical of a
variety of legal interpretations coming out of
the executive branch, like the so-called
torture memos, that they are not giving the
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president any deference."
But some justices seemed to leave a door
open, suggesting that the decision is not so
much a judicial attack on executive power as
it is an insistence that Congress, rather than
a small group of administration lawyers,
must play a leading role in formulating the
response to terror.
"Where, as here, no emergency prevents
consultation with Congress," Justice Stephen
G. Breyer wrote in a brief concurrence that
three other justices joined, "judicial
insistence upon that consultation does not
weaken our nation's ability to deal with
danger. To the contrary, that insistence
strengthens the nation's ability to
determine-through democratic means-
how best to do so."
But Professor Yoo was not inclined to
accept the decision as a triumph of the
democratic process. Instead, he saw it as a
judicial usurpation of the president's power
to protect the nation. "The court is saying
we're going to be a player now," he observed
ruefully.
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David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey
One of the more serious misconceptions
about the Supreme Court's decision in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld is that it requires
application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
to the war on terror generally and that as a
result Congress is somehow constrained in
how it chooses to address detainee issues.
This is simply not the case. The Hamdan
court ruled on a narrow issue involving
Common Article 3 "common" because it
appears in all four Geneva treaties. It did not
suggest that the Geneva Conventions
otherwise benefit members of al Qaeda or
their allies, that such individuals must be
given the rights and privileges of lawful
prisoners of war or that Congress must
reflect this policy in a new statute
authorizing military commissions. Indeed,
both as a matter of constitutional law and
policy, Congress has very broad discretion
in devising an appropriate set of procedures
for military commissions.
Application of the four Geneva Conventions
has been one of the war on terror's most
contentious legal issues. In the aftermath of
the September 11 attacks, the Bush
administration correctly concluded that
neither members of al Qaeda nor their
Taliban allies are entitled to Geneva
Convention protection as either POWs or
civilians. Al Qaeda and allied operatives are
not POWs because that status, which
involves a number of important rights upon
capture and detention, is reserved for those
who meet the most critical criteria of lawful
combatants a regular command structure,
uniforms, carrying arms openly and
eschewing deliberate attacks on the civilian
population prior to capture. At the same
time, they are not civilians because they
engage in hostilities. Nothing in the Hamdan
ruling questions this construction of the
treaties.
Rather, the Hamdan court only addressed
Common Article 3 in relation to the question
of how military commissions must be
organized. This was relevant to its decision
because section 821 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) recognizes the
legality of military commissions and their
traditional jurisdiction under the "law of
war." The law of war, of course, is made up
of various customary norms and practices as
well as a number of important treaties to
which the United States is a party including
the Geneva Conventions. Where it applies,
during "internal" armed conflicts, Common
Article 3 provides certain minimal
humanitarian requirements designed for the
context of a civil war.
Through some very fast judicial footwork
transforming the international conflict
between the United States and al Qaeda into
an internal conflict in Afghanistan the
Supreme Court concluded that Common
Article 3 applied in Hamdan as part of the
"law of war" referenced in section 821.
The practical result, however, is minimal.
Most if not all of Common Article 3 is
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entirely consistent with what has been Bush
administration policy. Most importantly, the
provision requires that detainees must be
treated humanely (a point the president has
consistently stressed) and that they can be
criminally punished only after "judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted
court." Because another UCMJ section
(1836) requires that military commissions
generally follow the same rules as regular
courts martial, and because the government
failed to justify departures from this, the
court ruled that these military commissions
were not "regularly constituted." This was
the technical, and narrow, basis of the
court's decision; the critics' claims that the
court has held the Geneva Conventions
apply to the war on terror are just wrong.
Moreover, the Supreme Court did not
suggest nor could it have suggested that
Congress was bound by the court's
interpretation of Common Article 3, or any
other part of the Geneva Conventions, in
future military commission legislation. That
interpretation is the law of the Hamdan case
and must be followed as precedent by lower
courts facing similar factual situations.
However, the political branches are
constitutionally entitled to determine the
meaning of treaties as they relate to the
international legal obligations of the United
States.
In the first instance, the president (as in the
Supreme Court's own words, the "sole
organ" of American foreign-policy) is
entitled to interpret treaties to which the
United States is a party. In addition,
Congress is constitutionally entitled to
legislate in ways that are inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's view of any particular
treaty (or, for that matter, with the
president's view), and the court must apply
the later enactment as binding. That is
textbook constitutional law.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has not
required that the Geneva Conventions be
applied in the war on terror; neither
members of al Qaeda nor their allies,
including members of the Taliban, must be
granted POW status because of the Hamdan
decision. Even more importantly, Congress
is not required to adopt the court's view of
Common Article 3 in its consideration and
enactment of new legislation on military
commissions. That legislation should, of
course, be consistent with U.S. international
obligations but only as interpreted by the
president and Congress in their respective
constitutional roles.
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The Bush administration likely will have to
extend rights to terrorism suspects at the
U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, that it has denied for years, after the
Supreme Court invalidated the government's
system of military trials and ruled that the
detainees must be treated according to
international standards, officials and experts
said yesterday.
Senior administration officials
acknowledged that the ruling scuttles their
plans to put as many as 80 detainees through
administration-created "military
commissions"-with extremely limited
rights-and said it is unclear how they will
respond. The 5 to 3 ruling in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld sent officials scrambling to
evaluate options for the 450 detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, some of whom have been
held for more than four years without trial.
The choices, experts and government
officials said yesterday, largely include
putting suspects through time-tested military
courts-martial, charging them in U.S.
criminal courts or working with Congress to
develop new rules to comply with the court's
decision.
The administration could also ask foreign
governments to try the more than 150
prisoners it considers hard-core terrorism
suspects. The rest are likely to be returned to
their home countries for further detention or
release.
But if the United States decides it wants to
hold the trials, detainees probably would
gain more access to the evidence against
them and the right to be present for much or
all of the proceedings-both of which were
denied in some circumstances under the
military commission rules, the experts and
officials said.
The court did not rule on whether
Guantanamo Bay should be closed, and its
action does not affect operations at the
facility. Military officials said yesterday that
scheduled military commission hearings for
10 suspects have been suspended.
Retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, a
professor of international affairs at the U.S.
Military Academy who visited Guantanamo
Bay last week, said the military
commissions were destined to fail. He said
the government should have used courts-
martial and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), which grants defendants
more rights.
"We put ourselves in an unnecessary legal
mess from the beginning, and now we've
gotten ourselves in such a mess legally and
politically, there's no easy solution,"
McCaffrey said yesterday. "The UCMJ is
the only way to go forward."
Senior members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee yesterday vowed to
quickly develop legislation to govern
military trials for terrorism suspects,
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announcing just hours after the court's ruling
their intent to hold hearings and develop law
by September. Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.),
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said
he plans to reintroduce legislation next
month that would authorize military
commissions.
Sen. Lindsey 0. Graham (R-S.C.) said he
also plans legislation. "We are stronger as a
nation when all three branches buy into the
legal framework," he said.
Graham said it would be "chaos" to try such
detainee cases in criminal courts, arguing
that the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks should be
treated as acts of war and not crimes to be
prosecuted in civilian courts.
Senior administration officials, requesting
anonymity during a teleconference call with
reporters, said they plan to work with
Congress but are not ruling out anything.
"There's no particular direction that we're
heading in right now except to review the
decision and consider all options that would
be available to us and Congress," one
official said.
Several officials said the U.S. courts are too
limiting, in part because the strict rules of
evidence could cause problems in cases in
which suspects were arrested by a foreign
government, held for years and transferred
without critical evidence-and whose trials
would require the presence of witnesses who
are difficult, if not impossible, to locate.
Many experts and human rights groups
favored the use of the UCMJ, which they
described as transparent and fair.
"You could pass legislation that authorizes
military commissions that look essentially
like military courts-martial and that would
be consistent with the decision, but why do
that when we already have courts-martial
that are consistent with the decision?" asked
Tom Malinowski, Washington advocacy
director for Human Rights Watch.
Rights groups hailed the decision as a major
victory for the rule of law in America. The
ruling appeared to grant detainees certain
protections under the Geneva Conventions
Common Article 3, which could require the
U.S. government to treat all detainees in the
war on terrorism-whether they are held in
the United States or abroad, or in secret
facilities operated by the CIA-according to
international standards.
"Just because you're a president at war
doesn't mean the law ceases to exist," said
Jumana Musa, a lawyer at Amnesty
International. "The best-case scenario now is
that they charge the detainees under an
established system of law. If they're not
going to charge them, they need to release
them."
Unlike evidence in most criminal or military
court proceedings, the bulk of the
government's evidence against suspected
terrorists at Guantanamo Bay can be
circumstantial and classified. The cases
against many Guantanamo Bay detainees
may rest on statements gleaned from
interrogations of prisoners throughout the
world, as well as from intelligence collected
by the CIA and others.
Safeguarding such information is a principal
concern of the U.S. government. "In most
situations, that's always going to be the
overriding concern," said Robert
McNamara, a CIA general counsel until
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2001. "You shouldn't have to decide to let
someone go to protect sources and
methods."
The State Department has sought to transfer
all but the most dangerous detainees to their
countries of origin. But this has proved
problematic for several reasons, said Pierre
Prosper, the State Department's former
ambassador at large for war crimes, who
spent most of his tenure traveling the globe
to work out such transfers.
"Some countries had reservations about
inheriting the security risk that the detainees
posed," Prosper said. Others did not have the
secure prisons and professional guards
necessary to assure U.S. authorities that they
would remain in custody.
In other cases, particularly in Europe, it
would be illegal to hold detainees
transferred from Guantanamo Bay unless
they could be charged with a specific crime.
In some cases, the U.S. military is unwilling
to give European authorities the classified
evidence they would need
John B. Bellinger III, legal adviser to
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, said
this week that relocation efforts continue,
especially for about 300 detainees from
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, who
make up about two-thirds of Guantanamo
Bay's population.
"We want to get out of the Guantanamo
business if we can," Bellinger said.
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"Detainee Rights Create a Divide on Capitol Hill"
The New York Times
July 10, 2006
Kate Zernike and Sheryl Gay Stolberg
The Supreme Court decision striking down
the use of military commissions to bring
terrorism detainees to trial has set off sharp
differences among Republicans in Congress
over what kind of rights detainees should be
granted and how much deference should be
shown the president in deciding the issue.
The debate is expected to consume the rest
of the summer in Congress as lawmakers
head into an election season expected to be
dominated by issues of national security.
The issue reflects the difficult legal,
diplomatic and political choices the
government faces in dealing with terrorism
suspects.
The divisions do not fall strictly along
traditional partisan lines and are as much
within the parties as between them,
particularly for Republicans. On one side of
the debate are Republicans who believe
Congress should give the president the
authority to set up the kind of military
commissions that were struck down by the
court. Such commissions would sharply
curtail defendants' rights.
On the other side are those who say the trials
should be modeled on the military system of
courts-martial, an approach that would give
detainees more due-process rights than
would the commissions. In between, many
Republicans and Democrats alike argue for
starting with the military judicial system and
tweaking it to reflect the differences of
trying terrorism suspects.
The debate will play out in a series of
Congressional hearings quickly scheduled
for this week, as lawmakers return to
Washington after their weeklong Fourth of
July recess.
Aides to President Bush said they had not
yet reached any conclusions about what
legislation should look like. Dan Bartlett,
counselor to Mr. Bush, said lawyers for the
White House, State Department and Justice
Department were still reviewing the court's
decision in the case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of
South Carolina, who is expected to take a
leading role on the issue as a member of the
Armed Services Committee, argued that the
administration's version of the military
commissions had to be "reined in" to make
clear, for instance, that evidence gathered by
coercive interrogation techniques could not
be introduced as evidence.
"I'm trying to get my colleagues to think
about the international community's
reception to what we do," said Mr. Graham,
a former military lawyer. "We've got a
chance to improve our image."
In its decision, the Supreme Court said, on a
5-to-3 vote, that the planned commissions
were unauthorized by federal statute and
violated international law.
Administration officials, who have been
consulting with Mr. Graham, are looking to
him to play a central part in drafting
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legislation. Senators John W. Warner of
Virginia, who is chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, and John McCain of
Arizona also are expected to be at the
forefront for the Republicans, while Senator
Carl Levin of Michigan is quite likely to
emerge as a point man for the Democrats.
On the Judiciary Committee, Senator Arlen
Specter of Pennsylvania, the Republican
chairman, and Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the
committee's ranking Democrat, who first
proposed Congressional action on military
tribunals in 2001, are also expected to play
central roles.
The Supreme Court decision left lawmakers
with the challenge of resolving a
complicated legal issue under the pressure of
a heated election season and a limited
amount of time left on their calendar.
While both parties are united in saying they
want to act quickly, they face fights over
what form of trial to use and whether the
protections of the Geneva Conventions
apply to terrorism suspects.
In hearings on Capitol Hill this week, the
House Armed Services Committee will take
testimony from lawyers, including several
sympathetic to the administration. Two
Senate committees, Judiciary and Armed
Services, will take testimony from
constitutional lawyers and top military
lawyers, who some Republican senators
believe were ignored in the White House
discussions that led to the establishment of
commissions. The only administration
officials scheduled to testify are lawyers
from the Justice Department and the
Pentagon.
While Republicans are divided on central
issues, Democrats have their own challenge.
They see the court's decision as a rare
rebuke to Mr. Bush, and they hope to turn
the debate into a broader one over
presidential power. But they said they also
recognized that they must cooperate on
legislation or risk being portrayed as weak
on terrorism.
Some Republicans and many Democrats say
that the administration may have hurt itself
by rebuffing efforts as early as 2001 by
Republicans and Democrats in the Senate to
set up some kind of military commission.
"Congress is going to want to be a full
partner, and not a rubber stamp for this
process," said Senator John Cornyn,
Republican of Texas and a close ally of the
White House.
The central question is what kind of forum
to set up. Commissions allow the
government wide berth in introducing
evidence, including hearsay, which is
banned in military courts, and restrict the
rights of the accused to be present in the
court and to see the evidence against them.
Military courts-martial, while not as strict as
civilian courts, restrict the kind of evidence
that can be introduced and allow the accused
to interview witnesses and see even
classified evidence.
The White House has long resisted anything
like courts-martial, saying they could require
the government to choose between dropping
the charges and disclosing more than it
wants to about the sources and nature of the
intelligence used to develop a case against
the detainees.
Senator Warner, who will direct the hearings
as chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, said he wanted a system that
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relied "as much as possible" on the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, which the court
decision said governed the treatment of
detainees.
Many lawmakers said they supported an
approach based on some tweaking of the
military system. Senators Graham and
Specter, along with Representative Duncan
Hunter, Republican of California and the
chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, advocate allowing hearsay, as
well as a procedure to deal with classified
evidence. The rules would be looser than in
a court-martial but stricter than in a
commission.
"We have to have a system that operates in
the war on terror and one that doesn't tie us
into knots trying to prosecute the people
who have killed Americans in large
numbers," Mr. Hunter said.
John C. Yoo, a professor of law at the
University of California, Berkeley, who
worked on orders expanding presidential
power in the treatment of detainees as a
former lawyer for the Justice Department,
said, "The debate that people are having is
whether it's going to be a short bill that just
overrules Hamdan completely, which you
could do in one sentence, or whether it's
going to be a much more comprehensive law
that tries to set out essentially a code of
procedure for the military commission."
But any effort simply to codify the
president's order establishing commissions
would be fiercely resisted by influential
Democrats.
"The Supreme Court said the president
cannot continue to break the law," said Mr.
Leahy, the Vermont Democrat. "The worst
thing to do would be to simply paper that
over and say we'll make it possible for him
to break the law."
An effort by Mr. Leahy in 2001 to introduce
legislation establishing tribunals was
rebuffed by the White House. "They said no,
they knew what they were doing, they would
do it alone," Mr. Leahy said. "What's
happened? Five years, there have been no
trials, no convictions, nothing has happened,
we've had our reputation severely hurt
throughout the rest of the world."
Mr. Graham similarly called it "a mistake" to
give Congressional blessing to the military
commissions as envisioned in Mr. Bush's
presidential order. "We have a chance to
start over," he said.
Another central question is whether the
Geneva Conventions extend to accused
terrorists. Mr. Graham and Mr. Comyn say
no, and Mr. Graham wants Congress to pass
legislation overturning the court's finding
that Common Article 3 of the conventions
applies to detainees. The article's provisions
outlawing degrading treatments, he believes,
could mean that American soldiers would be
subject to prosecution in the war on terror.
But Mr. Cornyn, a former judge, said that
the reference to Article 3 meant simply that
any court must be established within the
military justice system.
"Congress should not, and the court did not
hold that, they are entitled to the whole
panoply of rights that the prisoner of war
would be entitled to under circumstances
where the Geneva Conventions apply," Mr.
Comyn said.
Other Republicans, though, fear that any
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system that does not pay heed to the court's
mentioning of the Geneva Conventions risks
being rejected by the court again.
"We've got to structure this law in such a
way that if it ever came back up through the
Supreme Court, it will not be struck down,"
Mr. Warner said. "It's important for the
credibility of the United States to put this
issue at rest and let the world realize we're
affording them the protections as the
Supreme Court outlined."
Democrats will argue that harsh conditions
at Guantanamo have made the prison a
rallying cry for new terrorist recruits.
"The issue we believe is most prescient is
not the balance between security and liberty,
where on issues like this the parties are
relatively close, but on competence," said
Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of
New York. "They just don't do it right,
wherever they go. By their stubbornness and
refusal to work with Congress, they've made
us worse off in Guantanamo today."
Congress has rearranged its schedule to
debate the issue this month, and those
leading the debate say that they want to vote
on new legislation, if any is needed, by
September.
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"Scholars Agree That Congress Could Reject Conventions, but Not That It Should"
The New York Times
July 15, 2006
Adam Liptak
The Supreme Court's decision last month
striking down the administration's plans
to try detainees held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, was widely hailed as a sweeping
triumph for judicial supremacy,
individual liberty and international law.
In its most striking holding, the court
said that a provision of the Geneva
Conventions concerning the humane
treatment of prisoners applied to all
aspects of the conflict with Al Qaeda.
But the decision included an escape
clause. "Nothing prevents the president
from returning to Congress to seek the
authority he believes necessary," Justice
Stephen G. Breyer wrote in a
concurrence joined by three other
justices.
And indeed, administration lawyers are
now asking Congress not only to
resurrect the trial procedures struck down
by the court but also to address the
prohibitions in Common Article 3 of the
conventions, which bar, among other
things, "outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment."
Legal scholars, including many who say
that overriding the Geneva Conventions
would be a terrible idea, agree that
Congress has the power to do so.
"Congress could come back and write
that blank check," said Peter J. Spiro, a
law professor at Temple University.
Martin S. Lederman, a former Justice
Department official now at the
Georgetown University law school,
agreed. "As a matter of domestic law,
Congress can pass a statute authorizing
what treaties forbid."
The general rule is that a treaty is a law
like any other, meaning a later law can
override it. "The last-enacted piece of
legislation is effective," said Scott L.
Silliman, a former military lawyer and
the executive director of the Center on
Law, Ethics and National Security at
Duke University. "Can Congress legally
restrict the application of the Geneva
Conventions? Yes, it can."
Such a move, however, would be
groundbreaking, given the status of the
Geneva Conventions in international law
and in the popular imagination.
"This is the most exalted humanitarian
law treaty enacted in the 20th century,"
said Derek P. Jinks, a law professor at the
University of Texas and the author of
"The Rules of War: The Geneva
Conventions in the Age of Terror."
To be sure, many nations have violated
the conventions in practice. But
apparently no national legislature has
ever taken the step of specifically
overriding them.
"The fact that no other country has done
it is a sign that this would be a
momentous and potentially catastrophic
step," said Harold Hongju Koh, who
served in the State Department in the
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Clinton administration and is dean of
Yale Law School. "Do we want to
encourage the parliaments of every
country in the world that wants to abuse,
humiliate and torture our soldiers to
reinterpret the Geneva Conventions?"
But that is a point about prudence, not
power.
"The issue is not whether they could do
it," Dean Koh said. "The question is how
much damage we would do to the fabric
of the law. It would put us on the wrong
side of history."
There is one significant but largely
symbolic caveat: any domestic
legislation overriding the conventions
and the conduct it authorized could still
violate international law. But
international law is an amorphous
concept with few enforcement
mechanisms.
Nonetheless, many experts say, the
political and practical consequences of
rejecting the conventions could provoke
a powerful anti-American backlash. "We
would be saying to the international
community, whose cooperation we
desperately need, particularly in
intelligence gathering, that we claim to
be a nation of laws but are not,"
Professor Silliman said.
Whatever the wisdom of overriding the
conventions, the legislative work to
disentangle it from the nation's laws
would be substantial. For instance, one
federal law makes it a war crime to
violate Common Article 3. If Congress
overrode aspects of the article, it would
presumably also need to amend the war
crimes law.
Among the questions left open by the
Supreme Court's decision, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, is whether people detained at
Guantanamo and elsewhere can sue over
violations of Common Article 3 and
whether officials who violate it can be
subject to prosecution.
Looking forward, scholars differed on the
question of whether Congress would be
free to offer its own interpretation of
Common Article 3, for example
determining that the article allows the
conditions that have existed at
Guantanamo, or whether it must pass
legislation rejecting it outright.
It is certainly true that the language of the
article is mostly general and open-
textured. It prohibits, in addition to
assaults on personal dignity, trials
without the legal rights "recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples."
But there are bodies of authority,
including domestic military law,
international treaties that use similar
language and decisions of international
tribunals, that have helped establish a
common understanding of the precise
meaning of the article. While a good-
faith debate, in Congress and elsewhere,
about the meaning of some of the phrases
should be welcomed, Professor Jinks
said, the language can be stretched only
so far.
"It's going to be very difficult for the
administration to demonstrate," he said
by way of example, "that any of the so-
called enhanced interrogation techniques
are consistent with Common Article 3."
Among the techniques used at
Guantanamo were extreme temperatures,
sleep deprivation, blaring music and
sexual humiliation.
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The administration contends that with the
exceptions of the procedures it planned
to use to try detainees suspected of
terrorism, it has been in compliance with
Common Article 3 even in the years it
said it was not bound by it.
Professor Jinks said there was an
argument to be made for even an
implausible Congressional interpretation
of Common Article 3 if the alternative
was outright repudiation, if only because
the rest of the world might view that as
slightly less provocative.
"Out-and-out defiance of the treaty is a
deeply damaging act," Professor Jinks
said. "The question is how much trouble
we want to make for ourselves: a lot of
trouble, or more trouble than we could
possibly imagine."
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"Administration Prods Congress To Curb the Rights of Detainees"
The New York Times
July 13, 2006
Kate Zernike; Mark Mazzetti and Sheryl
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failure to comply with Common Article
Three was a violation of the War Crimes
Act, applying the article to detainees could
lead to American troops being charged with
felony crimes for interrogation tactics that
might be argued to be too harsh.
"Congress needs to do something to bring
clarity and certainty to Common Article
Three," Steven G. Bradbury, an acting
assistant attorney general, told the House
Armed Services Committee on Wednesday.
Administration lawyers argued that the
White House's statement Tuesday night was
not a shift, but an announcement and an
interpretation of the court's decision. In an
interview, Senator Lindsey Graham,
Republican of South Carolina, said he
agreed.
"I think what they're saying is, Until we get
further direction we're going to do the
following," Mr. Graham said. "That doesn't
preclude them or us from giving definition."
The outcome of the debate could affect
detainees around the world. The Pentagon
holds about 1,000 Qaeda and Taliban
detainees at Guantanamo and at bases in
Afghanistan. An estimated three dozen
terror suspects are believed to be held by the
C.I.A. at secret sites abroad.
In a week of hearings on Capitol Hill,
administration lawyers have argued that the
best way to bring detainees to trial after the
court's ruling would be for Congress to
ratify the military commissions the court
struck down, with what Daniel J. Dell'Orto,
a Pentagon deputy general counsel,
described as "minor tweaking."
But several scholars and military lawyers
have said that the best way to meet the
court's requirements on providing legal and
human rights to detainees would be to start
with the court-martial procedure set up in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
modify that.
Several lawmakers have said that only a
solution that extended Geneva protections to
detainees would survive another court
challenge.
"It's got to be dealt with so that we do not
face a future court challenge, and also so
that the international community recognizes
our credibility in dealing with these things,"
said Senator Warner, whose Armed Services
Committee will hold hearings on the issue
on Thursday.
Military lawyers, human rights groups and
some lawmakers have warned that an effort
by Congress to limit the rights granted to
terror suspects under the Geneva
Conventions would blacken the United
States' reputation internationally, by
effectively announcing to the world that it
was reneging on a fundamental and
commonly held notion of human rights.
"We should embrace Common Article Three
and sing its praises from the rooftops," Rear
Adm. John D. Hutson, a former judge
advocate general of the Navy who is retired,
told the Armed Services Committee. "To
avoid it or try to draft our way out of it is
unbecoming the United States."
But administration lawyers argue that the
vagueness of the language in the
provision-including the right to "judicial
guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples"-opened
the way to problems.
"We just think as you approach these issues,
you should give definition and certainty to
these issues," Mr. Bradbury told the Senate
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Judiciary Committee on Wednesday.
Even some Republicans who are fighting the
administration's approach on establishing
trials for the terror suspects agree on the
need to limit the application of Article
Three.
Senator Graham, who pointedly warned
administration lawyers that the president
would not win by fighting for his approach
on trials, said in interviews that Common
Article Three must be "reined in." He said it
would make death penalty crimes of current
interrogation techniques, including keeping
detainees awake and forcing them to sit in
extremely hot or cold cells-methods he
referred to as "things that are not torture but
are aggressive."
"What we need to do is take the ruling of
Hamdan and define it so that people will not
be unfairly prosecuted because they didn't
know what was in bounds or not," Mr.
Graham said.
Mr. Graham said defining Article Three
would be "the hardest part" of the debate on
how to bring detainees to trial. He suggested
that Congress could limit it in a way that
resembled the language of the measure
setting standards for the treatment of
detainees that was written by Senator John
McCain, Republican of Arizona, and signed
into law last year.
"It says that every detainee will be treated
humanely and that cruel, inhumane
treatment will not be allowed against
detainees," Mr. Graham said. "Common
Article Three with its language goes well
beyond the McCain standard."
Mr. Bradbury and Mr. Dell'Orto, too,
expressed a preference for Mr. McCain's
language.
Legal experts agree that the White House's
announcement that it would give Article
Three rights to detainees puts future cases of
detainee abuse, like those at the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq in 2004, into the category of
war crimes. It raises the stakes, they said, for
how American troops treat detainees in
military custody.
"This isn't a 'trust me' kind of undertaking
anymore," said Diane Orentlicher, a
professor of law at American University in
Washington. "It's now a legal obligation."
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"White House Bill Proposes System to Try Detainees"
The New York Times
July 26, 2006
David S. Cloud and Sheryl Gay Stolberg
Legislation drafted by the Bush
administration setting out new rules on
bringing terror detainees to trial would allow
hearsay evidence to be introduced unless it
was deemed "unreliable" and would permit
defendants to be excluded from their own
trials if necessary to protect national
security, according to a copy of the
proposal.
The bill, which officials said was being
circulated within the administration, is not
final, but it indicates the direction of the
administration's approach for dealing with a
Supreme Court decision that struck down
the tribunals established to try terror
suspects at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.
The 32-page bill preserves the idea of using
military commissions to prosecute terror
suspects and makes modest changes in their
procedural rules, including several expanded
protections for defendants, many of them
drawn from the military's legal code. But
the proposal also sets up a possible
confrontation with lawmakers who have
called for modeling the trials on the
military's rules for courts-martial, which
would allow defendants more rights.
The draft measure describes court-martial
procedure as "not practicable in trying
enemy combatants" because doing so would
"require the government to share classified
information" and would exclude "hearsay
evidence determined to be probative and
reliable."
President Bush reviewed the bill last week
in a meeting with his top advisers, according
to a senior White House official, who said
the advisers told Mr. Bush that they were
comfortable with the bill and were ready to
present it to military lawyers. When the
legislation is in its final form, the
administration will have to ask a member of
Congress to introduce it.
The White House would not comment on
the specifics of the bill.
"We are in the middle of a process of getting
reaction from the various stakeholders, and
that is why we circulated a draft," said Dana
Perino, a deputy White House press
secretary. "We are working to strike a
balance of a fair system of justice that deals
with terrorists who don't recognize the rules
ofwar."
But one former White House official,
granted anonymity to discuss internal
deliberations, said the administration was
circulating the measure among military
lawyers at the Pentagon with the intention of
winning over Republican senators who have
led the calls for using court-martial
procedures, including Senator Lindsey
Graham of South Carolina, a former military
lawyer.
A copy of the draft legislation was provided
to The New York Times by an official at an
agency that is reviewing it. The copy was
labeled "for discussion purposes only,
deliberative draft, close hold," and the
official who shared it did so on condition of
anonymity. The official did not express an
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opinion about its contents.
Mr. Graham described the legislation, which
he reviewed briefly last week in a meeting
with administration officials, as "a good
start," but added, "I have some concerns."
He would not be specific, saying he wanted
to withhold judgment until hearing the views
of military lawyers.
Mr. Graham praised the administration for
engaging in "a collaborative process" and
said the measure incorporated some of his
suggestions, including the requirement that a
military judge be detailed to each
commission.
A senior Congressional aide said Senator
John McCain, Republican of Arizona, by
contrast, is believed to be more adamant that
using the existing commissions with modest
changes will not suffice, largely because of
the danger that American troops could face
similar treatment if captured abroad.
Though House Republicans are considered
more supportive of the administration's
plan, it could have difficulty passing the
Senate without additional changes, said
Eugene R. Fidell, the president of the
National Institute of Military Justice.
"I believe the sentiment on the Hill is for a
much more nuanced approach that tracks
much more closely with the procedures used
for general courts-martial," Mr. Fidell said.
He called the administration plan "a missed
opportunity."
Rather than requiring a speedy trial for
enemy combatants, the draft proposal says
they "may be tried and punished at any time
without limitations." Defendants could be
held until hostilities are completed, even if
found not guilty by a commission.
Nor does the bill adhere to the military's
rules for the admissibility of evidence and
witnesses at trial statements because "the
United States cannot safely require members
of the armed forces to gather evidence on
the battlefield as though they were police
officers," the proposal says.
The draft bill specifies that no matter how it
is gathered, evidence "shall be admissible if
the military judge" determines it has
"probative value." Hearsay statements,
meaning something a witness has heard but
does not know to be true, would be allowed
"at the discretion of the judge unless the
circumstances render it unreliable or lacking
in probative value."
The bill would also bar "statements obtained
by the use of torture" from being introduced
as evidence, but evidence obtained during
interrogations where coercion was used
would be admissible unless a military judge
found it "unreliable."
The provision allowing defendants to be
excluded from a trial to prevent them from
hearing classified evidence against them is
likely to be among the more controversial
aspects of the administration's plan. The bill
notes that "members of Al Qaeda cannot be
trusted with our nation's secrets." But the
bill specifies that the "exclusion of the
accused shall be no broader than necessary"
and requires that a declassified summary of
the information be given to defendants.
One of the most difficult issues the
administration faces is whether a provision
of the Geneva Conventions, known as
Common Article Three, applies to detainees;
the Supreme Court ruled that it did. The
measure says explicitly that the Geneva
Conventions "are not a source of judicially
enforceable individual rights," meaning that
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in the future, terror suspects like Salim
Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni held at
Guantinamo whose case resulted in the
Supreme Court ruling, cannot file lawsuits
saying their Geneva Convention rights were
violated.
"This draft shows that the executive branch
doesn't think the Supreme Court got the
questions on the Geneva Conventions right
in Hamdan," said John C. Yoo, a law
professor at the University of California,
Berkeley, who as a Justice Department
lawyer helped draft the president's original
order establishing the military commissions.
Officials said the bill was drafted by Steven
G. Bradbury, acting assistant attorney
general. On Tuesday, Attorney General
Alberto R. Gonzales met with Senator John
W. Warner of Virginia, the Republican
chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
about the administration's proposal. Mr.
Gonzalez later went to the Pentagon to brief
senior civilian and military officials,
including the judge advocates general from
each of the services, a Pentagon official
said.
Getting the support of uniformed Pentagon
lawyers could prove critical to the fate of the
measure. At a hearing before the Senate
Armed Services Committee earlier this
month, each of the judge advocates general
said that, like some lawmakers, they
preferred a system for trying detainees that
relied on the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which governs court-martial
proceedings for United States service
personnel.
That was at odds with testimony from
civilian lawyers from the Departments of
Defense and Justice, who had said that they
believed the military code was inappropriate
for prosecuting terror suspects and
recommended that Congress retain the
administration's military commission
system. Pentagon officials said they were
still open to suggested changes from the
military lawyers.
Eric Ruff, the Pentagon spokesman, said
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld "is
asking that draft legislation be reviewed by
everyone from a legal as well as policy
perspective, and he would like them to
provide feedback on what the effects might




U.S. Judge Finds Wiretap Actions Violate the Law
The New York Times
August 18, 2006
Adam Liptak and Eric Lichtblau
A federal judge ruled yesterday that the
National Security Agency's program to
wiretap the international communications of
some Americans without a court warrant
violated the Constitution, and she ordered it
shut down.
The ruling was the first judicial assessment
of the Bush administration's arguments in
defense of the surveillance program, which
has provoked fierce legal and political
debate since it was disclosed last December.
But the issue is far from settled, with the
Justice Department filing an immediate
appeal and succeeding in allowing the
wiretapping to continue for the time being.
In a sweeping decision that drew on history,
the constitutional separation of powers and
the Bill of Rights, Judge Anna Diggs Taylor
of United States District Court in Detroit
rejected almost every administration
argument.
Judge Taylor ruled that the program violated
both the Fourth Amendment and a 1978 law
that requires warrants from a secret court for
intelligence wiretaps involving people in the
United States. She rejected the
administration's repeated assertions that a
2001 Congressional authorization and the
president's constitutional authority allowed
the program.
"It was never the intent of the framers to
give the president such unfettered control,
particularly when his actions blatantly
disregard the parameters clearly enumerated
in the Bill of Rights," she wrote. "The three
separate branches of government were
developed as a check and balance for one
another."
Republicans said the decision was the work
of a liberal judge advancing a partisan
agenda. Judge Taylor, 73, worked in the
civil rights movement, supported Jimmy
Carter's presidential campaign and was
appointed to the bench by him in 1979. She
was the first black woman to serve on the
Detroit federal trial court.
She has ruled for the A.C.L.U. in a lawsuit
challenging religious displays on municipal
property. But she has also struck down a
Detroit ordinance favoring minority
contractors. "Her reputation is for being a
real by-the-books judge," said Evan H.
Caminker, the dean of the University of
Michigan Law School.
The government said it would ask Judge
Taylor to stay her order at a hearing on Sept.
7.
The Justice Department and the American
Civil Liberties Union - which brought the
case in Detroit on behalf of a group of
lawyers, scholars, journalists and others -
agreed that her order would not be enforced
until then, but lawyers for the A.C.L.U. said
they would oppose any further stay.
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Administration officials made it clear that
they would fight to have the ruling
overturned because, they said, it would
weaken the country's defenses if allowed to
stand.
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, at a
hastily called news conference after the
decision, said he was both surprised and
disappointed by the ruling on the operation,
which focuses on communications of people
suspected of ties to Al Qaeda.
Administration officials "believe very
strongly that the program is lawful," said Mr.
Gonzales, a main architect of the program as
White House counsel and the biggest
defender of its legality in a series of public
pronouncements that began after the
program was disclosed by The New York
Times last December.
"We're going to do everything we can do in
the courts to allow this program to
continue," he said, because it "has been
effective in protecting America."
Tony Snow, the White House spokesman,
also described the surveillance program as a
vital and lawful tool. "The whole point is to
detect and prevent terrorist attacks before
they can be carried out," Mr. Snow said.
"The terrorist surveillance program is firmly
grounded in law and regularly reviewed to
make sure steps are taken to protect civil
liberties."
Democrats applauded the ruling as an
important affirmation of the rule of law,
while lawyers for the A.C.L.U. said Judge
Taylor's decision was a sequel to the
Supreme Court's decision in June in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that struck down the
administration's plans to try detainees held
in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, for war crimes.
"It's another nail in the coffin of executive
unilateralism," said Jameel Jaffer, an
A.C.L.U. lawyer.
But allies of the administration called the
decision legally questionable and politically
motivated.
"It is an appallingly bad opinion, bad from
both a philosophical and technical
perspective, manifesting strong bias," said
David B. Rivkin, an official in the
administrations of President Ronald Reagan
and the first President Bush. "It is
guaranteed to be overturned."
Mr. Gonzales would not say whether the
program played any role in foiling a plot last
week to set off bombs in airliners bound for
the United States from Britain. But Speaker
J. Dennis Hastert, Republican of Illinois,
suggested that it did play a role in the
investigation.
In a written statement criticizing Judge
Taylor's ruling, Mr. Hastert defended the
wiretapping operation and said that "our
terrorist surveillance programs are critical to
fighting the war on terror and saved the day
by foiling the London terror plot."
His office declined to elaborate.
Mr. Gonzales said he expected that the
ruling would play a role in the debate in
Congress over how and whether to change
federal eavesdropping laws. But he said the
exact impact was "hard to predict."
Among competing proposals, Republican
leaders have proposed legislation that would
specifically permit the wiretapping program.
Some Democrats, however, have introduced
legislation that would restrict, or in some
cases ban altogether, the government from
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conducting wiretaps on Americans without a
warrant.
The White House is backing a plan, drafted
by Senator Arlen Specter, Republican of
Pennsylvania, with the blessing of President
Bush, that would allow a secret court to
review the legality of the operation.
But in the view of critics, it could also
broaden the president's authority to conduct
such operations. Mr. Gonzales said it
appeared to administration lawyers that the
Specter legislation, if passed by Congress,
"would address some of the concerns raised
by the judge in her opinion."
Another element of the Specter legislation
would force other lawsuits over the program
- like the one brought by the A.C.L.U. in
Detroit - to be consolidated into a single
action to be heard by the secret court.
Judge Taylor rejected the government's
threshold argument that she should not hear
the case at all because it concerned state
secrets. Dismissal on those grounds was not
required, she wrote, because the central facts
in the case - the existence of the program,
the lack of warrants and the focus on
communications in which one party is in the
United States - have been acknowledged
by the government.
The government also argued that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because
they had not suffered concrete harm from
the program. Judge Taylor ruled that the
plaintiffs "are stifled in their ability to
vigorously conduct research, interact with
sources, talk with clients and, in the case of
the attorney plaintiffs, uphold their oath of
providing effective and ethical
representation of their clients."
Some plaintiffs, the judge wrote, have had to
incur travel expenses to visit clients and
others to avoid possible monitoring of their
communications.
Going beyond the arguments offered against
the wiretapping program by many legal
scholars, Judge Taylor ruled that it violated
not only the 1978 law, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, but also the
Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the
question of whether electronic surveillance
of partly domestic communication violates
the Fourth Amendment. Judge Taylor
concluded that the wiretapping program is
"obviously in violation of the Fourth
Amendment."
The president also violated the
Constitution's separation of powers
doctrines, Judge Taylor ruled. Neither a
September 2001 Congressional
authorization to use military force against Al
Qaeda nor the president's inherent
constitutional powers allow him to violate
the 1978 law or the Fourth Amendment, she
said.
"There are no hereditary kings in America
and no powers not created by the
Constitution," she wrote, rejecting what she
called the administration's assertion that the
president "has been granted the inherent
power to violate not only the laws of the
Congress but the First and Fourth
Amendments of the Constitution itself."
Republicans attacked the decision. "It is
disappointing that a judge would take it
upon herself to disarm America during a
time of war," said Representative Peter
Hoekstra, Republican of Michigan, the
C
chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee.
Judge Taylor did give the government a
minor victory, rejecting on national security
grounds a challenge to a separate
surveillance program involving data mining.
That ruling is consistent with recent
decisions of federal courts in San Francisco
and Chicago.
Judges in those cases drew a distinction
between the wiretapping program, which the
administration has acknowledged and
defended, and the data mining program,
which has not been officially confirmed.
D




Today's Supreme Court ruling in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld represents a major defeat for the
Bush administration when it comes to trying
detainees at Guantanamo Bay. But could it
mean something more? We can't claim to
speak with authority just yet about the 180
pages of opinion the court issued this
morning, but there are a couple of intriguing
possibilities here.
Warrantless wiretaps: As Think Progress
argues, the Hamdan decision could offer a
glimpse of how the Supreme Court would
view the Bush administration's warrantless
wiretapping program. In today's decision,
five justices-Kennedy, Stevens, Souter,
Breyer and Ginsburg-reject the Bush
administration's argument that the power to
try detainees by military tribunal was
implied in the Authorization for Use of
Military Force approved by Congress in the
days after 9/11. As Think Progress explains,
the Bush administration has advanced
exactly the same argument in support of its
warrantless wiretapping program. That is,
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and
other administration officials have argued
that Congress somehow implicitly
authorized the warrantless wiretapping of
American citizens when it passed the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, or
AUMF, in 2001.
So if the AUMF didn't implicitly authorize
the use of military tribunals at Guantanamo,
it probably didn't authorize the warrantless
wiretaps either, right? That's how it seems,
but readers with a keen memory will recall
that in the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision in
2004, five justices-O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, Breyer and, in a separate opinion,
Thomas-reached the conclusion that the
AUMF did authorize the detention of enemy
combatants for the duration of the conflict in
which they were captured. Sandra Day
O'Connor wrote then that it is "of no
moment" that the AUMF says nothing about
detaining enemy combatants. "Because
detention to prevent a combatant's return to
the battlefield is a fundamental incident of
waging war," O'Connor said, "in permitting
the use of 'necessary and appropriate force,'
Congress has clearly and unmistakably
authorized detention in the narrow
circumstances considered here."'
Why is the outcome in Hamdan different?
That's a question for Stephen Breyer and
Anthony Kennedy to answer; they thought
the AUMF authorized the detention of the
enemy combatants in Hamdi, and now they
say it doesn't authorize the use of the
military tribunals in Hamdan. In separate
opinions, Breyer and Kennedy do answer
the question, more or less. In adopting the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, they say,
Congress set forth the circumstances under
which military tribunals can be used and the
procedures they are to follow, and the court
shouldn't simply assume that the Congress
implicitly repealed those measures when it
adopted the AUMF. Congress' enactment on
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the detention of U.S. citizens, on the other
hand, specifically says that citizens may be
detained only "pursuant to an Act of
Congress." By the court's way of thinking,
the AUMF counted, however implicitly, as
the "Act of Congress" necessary to justify
detention. The Uniform Code of Military
Justice didn't create such an opening.
So what does it mean for warrantless
wiretapping? Assuming a legal challenge
ever got to the Supreme Court, the outcome
could turn on two questions. First, does the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act leave
open the possibility that another "Act of
Congress" might authorize spying without
the warrants FISA requires? Although FISA
itself says it's the "exclusive means by
which electronic surveillance may be
conducted," the administration has argued
that FISA actually contemplates the
possibility that a future act of Congress
could expand the president's surveillance
authorities. But even assuming the court
agreed with that view, it would still have to
grapple with the second question: If FISA
does contemplate additional, broader
authorizations for electronic surveillance,
did the AUMF amount to one? To answer
that question, the court would have to decide
whether spying on American citizens-and,
arguably, doing so without a warrant-is
such an inherent part of waging war that the
power to do so must be read into the AUMF
in the same way that the power to detain
enemy combatants was.
Mercifully, the Hamdan decision offers
some easier-to-analyze clues about the
interrogation techniques the Bush
administration is using in the war on terror.
At SCOTUSblog, Marty Lederman argues
that the Hamdan decision essentially
"resolves the debate" over what
interrogation techniques the United States
may use against detainees. The attorney
general has argued that the war on terror
"renders obsolete" the Geneva Conventions'
"strict limitations on questioning of enemy
prisoners and renders quaint some of its
provisions." But a majority of Supreme
Court justices seem to view things
differently. In a section of his opinion in
which four other justices joined, John Paul
Stevens says that the Geneva Conventions'
Common Article 3 applies to the U.S.
conflict with al-Qaida.
In addition to setting forth rules for trying
detainees-the question at issue in
Hamdan-Common Article 3 also provides
that detainees shall not be subject to "cruel
treatment and torture" or "outrages to
personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment." Lederman argues
that these prohibitions are stronger than
those contained in the McCain torture ban
the president signed last year. He might also
note that the administration has argued that
the McCain ban can't be invoked in court
with respect to detainees at Guantinamo-
an argument that may be moot if the Geneva
Contentions' protections apply anyway.
103
"Bush Compromises On Spying Program; Senate Bill Would Permit Court Review"
The Washington Post
July 14, 2006
Charles Babington and Peter Baker
Switching course on one of his most
controversial anti-terrorism policies,
President Bush agreed yesterday to submit
the administration's warrantless surveillance
program to a court for constitutional review.
A deal negotiated between the White House
and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) came with conditions.
Bush is insisting that Congress first give him
new leeway in some areas of surveillance
and that all lawsuits challenging his
eavesdropping policy be funneled to a
Washington-based intelligence court that
operates in secret.
Even so, the accord is a reversal of Bush's
position that he would not submit his
program to court review. The administration
has contended that the executive branch
already has the wartime authority it needs to
order the National Security Agency to
monitor e-mails and telephone calls between
the United States and foreign countries when
at least one party is suspected of terrorist
ties.
Specter has disputed that assertion, and
many Democrats and civil liberties groups
responded with outrage after the
surveillance program was disclosed in news
accounts last winter.
Bush agreed voluntarily to submit his
program to the court named for the 1978
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or
FISA, contingent on Congress passing
legislation drafted by Specter and
administration lawyers.
The legislation would allow the Justice
Department unlimited attempts to revise the
program to meet the court's approval and
would allow it to appeal adverse court
rulings. It would also give the NSA in
emergency situations a week rather than the
current 72 hours to eavesdrop on a domestic
target without requesting a warrant, and it
would allow the government to send to the
FISA court all lawsuits challenging the
program's legality. Some suits, filed by
groups such as the American Civil Liberties
Union, are already pending in various
federal courts.
Consolidating lawsuits under the FISA
system, Specter said, would prevent federal
courts "all over the country" from issuing
contradictory rulings on the NSA program.
Yesterday's agreement is the latest in a
series of concessions Bush has made in
recent days in his hard-line anti-terrorism
tactics. On Tuesday, the administration
agreed to apply key provisions of the
Geneva Conventions to all terrorism
suspects in U.S. custody, bowing to the
Supreme Court's rejection of its policies
involving the treatment of detainees. That
move unleashed a congressional debate,
which continued yesterday, on how best to
provide legal protections to detainees at
Guantanamo Bay and other U.S. prisons
without compromising national security.
Specter told reporters that Bush agreed to
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the plan's basic outlines before the Supreme
Court's decision on detainees was
announced.
Although the deal represented a clear retreat
by Bush, White House aides traveling with
him in Germany put an upbeat face on the
move. The president approved it in an Oval
Office meeting with Specter on Tuesday.
"The bill recognizes the president's
constitutional authority and modernizes
FISA to meet the threats we face from an
enemy that kills with abandon and hides as
they plot attacks," said spokeswoman Dana
M. Perino.
But Specter, briefing reporters at the
Capitol, said his bill would recognize the
president's constitutional powers only in
general terms and would make it clear that
the administration must defer to judicial
restraints. "The proposed legislation
acknowledges, as we must, the president's
inherent Article II authority," he said. "But
when the court makes a decision, the court
will make a decision in the traditional
context that the president does not have a
blank check.
"Unless the court finds it's constitutional,"
he said of the warrantless wiretap program,
"it cannot function."
Specter said it is unclear whether a FISA
court decision will be made public.
Several Democrats denounced the proposed
legislation. "The Specter bill is an end run
around the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act and provides the president a blank check
to conduct warrantless surveillance of
Americans," said Rep. Jane Harman (Calif.).
ranking Democrat on the House intelligence
committee.
The FISA court is composed of seven
federal district judges, who are appointed by
the chief justice. Congress established it to
authorize secret surveillance of espionage
and terrorism suspects within the United
States. The 1978 law required the Justice
Department to show probable cause for
targeting people.
But after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Bush
said warrantless wiretaps were justified in
the name of national security. For months,
Specter has pushed to have the FISA court
review the NSA program's constitutionality.
Some civil libertarians think Specter's
approach invites FISA to give broad
approval to surveillance efforts on an
unknown number of Americans, whereas the
original law presumed that there would be a
case-by-case review of individual situations.
Specter said his intent is to get a
"determination on constitutionality of the
overall program." He added: "It is
suggested, but I do not know, that it is
impractical to have individual warrants."
He said the bill would direct the attorney
general to tell the FISA court what steps
NSA takes to minimize the surveillance
program's scope and possible privacy
invasions, and to explain "how the program
is reasonably designed to ensure that the
communications intercepted involve a
terrorist, agent of a terrorist, or someone
reasonably believed to have communicated
or associated with a terrorist."
At the administration's insistence, the bill
would impose higher penalties for "officials
who knowingly misuse foreign intelligence
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information."
Consolidating lawsuits under the FISA
system, he said, would prevent federal
courts "all over the country" from issuing
contradictory rulings on the NSA program.
Specter predicted that Congress will pass his
bill, even though its two chambers have
clashed over immigration, the USA Patriot
Act and other matters. If Congress amends
the bill in any way that Bush disapproves, he
will not be obligated to submit the wiretap
program to the FISA court for review,
Specter said.
The Bush-Specter deal was reached after
intense negotiations over the past few weeks
following a public dustup over the issue
between the senator and Vice President
Cheney. Bush dispatched aides to Capitol
Hill to calm tempers and find a compromise.
The White House balked at an early draft
that would have mandated the president
submit the NSA program to the FISA court
for review. Specter agreed to make it
voluntary as long as Bush promised to
submit the program if Congress passes the
bill. Aides privately acknowledged it was a
big concession by a president who until now
has resisted judicial interference in how he
wages war against terrorists.
The White House conceded in part because
it believes the NSA program will survive
constitutional muster and the Specter bill
will make it easier to argue that the program
complies with congressional statutes as well.
"We've always said it's constitutional," said
one administration official who was not
authorized to speak on the record.
The language acknowledging the president's
constitutional authority to conduct
intelligence operations also was important
tothe White House. "We see it as historic
because here's a statute recognizing an
authority the president says he has," the
administration official said.
Still, that language alone might mean little
because it did not define the scope of the
authority or explicitly suggest that a
president did not need to seek court approval
for warrants. But at the same time, Specter
agreed to repeal a section of the original
FISA law that made it the exclusive statute
governing such intelligence programs.
The combination of the statement
acknowledging presidential authority and
the deletion of the exclusivity clause left
open the interpretation that Bush has the
power to conduct other surveillance outside
FISA's purview, a possibility administration
officials noted with approval.
Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) criticized
the agreement, saying he will oppose "any
bill that would grant blanket approval for
warrantless surveillance of Americans,
particularly when this administration has
never explained why it believes that current
law allowing surveillance of terrorist
suspects is inadequate."
Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) said:
"While I am pleased that President Bush
finally has conceded that the domestic
surveillance program should be subjected to
FISA court scrutiny, this should not exempt
the secret program from thorough
congressional scrutiny."
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"Fair Weather Friend of the Court"
The Weekly Standard
July 31, 2006
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Adam J. White
NOW THAT THE SUPREME COURT has
ruled against the White House on the
military detention of U.S. citizens and the
presidential institution of military
commissions, the next big legal issue seems
to be the National Security Agency's
warrantless surveillance of international
communications. Sen. Arlen Specter,
chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, recently had the chance to take
decisive action--either for or against the
president--when he introduced legislation
addressing the once-secret NSA program.
But he declined the opportunity in favor of a
third course: punting the issue to the courts.
This is hardly uncharted territory for
Specter. Throughout his career, he has
pledged his devotion to the courts and to
court precedent whenever it was politically
expedient to do so. But when the politics
point the other way, no senator is more
vocal in criticizing the judiciary.
NSA SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICANS'
INTERNATIONAL communications would
normally be subject to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which
requires that such surveillance generally be
conducted pursuant to a court order. Battling
criticism of President Bush's decision to
authorize a surveillance program that
circumvents FISA, the White House has
argued that the president's actions were
justified by the post-9/11 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) as well
as the president's inherent constitutional
authority to engage in such surveillance
regardless of statutory restrictions.
Specter has expressed his disagreement with
the AUMF argument but has remained
publicly agnostic on the more controversial
"inherent authority" issue. His draft
legislation doesn't weigh in on the issue, but
rather leaves it to the federal courts. After
Specter's proposed changes, Section 801 of
FISA would read: "Nothing in this Act shall
be construed to limit the constitutional
authority of the President to collect
intelligence with respect to foreign powers
and agents of foreign powers."
Some constitutional scholars, such as Orin
Kerr and Marty Lederman, understand this
language to endorse the president's
circumvention of otherwise applicable FISA
requirements. Such a reading seems
implausible, though, in light of the Supreme
Court's pre-FISA surveillance case United
States v. U.S. District Court ("Keith").
There, the Supreme Court considered
language indistinguishable from that in
Specter's draft. A federal statute limiting
surveillance provided that "[n]othing
contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the
constitutional power of the President to ...
obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the
United States." The Court refused to read
this language as endorsing surveillance
otherwise barred by the statute:
At most, this is an implicit recognition that
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the President does have certain powers in
the specified areas. Few would doubt this, as
the section refers--among other things--to
protection "against actual or potential attack
or other hostile acts of a foreign power." But
so far as the use of the President's electronic
surveillance power is concerned, the
language is essentially neutral. . . . It merely
provides that the Act shall not be interpreted
to limit or disturb such power as the
President may have under the Constitution.
In short, Congress simply left presidential
powers where it found them.
Specter's draft, like the Keith statute, does
not weigh in on the president's claim of
inherent authority: It leaves the claim
entirely to the courts. In a July 24 op-ed in
the Washington Post, Specter himself made
clear that "[t]he bill does not accede to the
president's claims of inherent presidential
power; that is for the courts either to affirm
or reject. It merely acknowledges them, to
whatever extent they may exist."
On the other hand, a strong affirmation or
rejection of the president's claim would
dramatically affect judicial review. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly shown (most
recently in its Hamdan decision) that, as per
Justice Robert Jackson's famous
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, the court will provide greater
deference to the executive's power when
Congress agrees with the president's
interpretation. Conversely, presidential
power is at its lowest ebb when the president
acts contrary to Congress' will. But Specter
would have no part in this.
THE PRESIDENT'S
AUTHORITY" is not the
Specter wants the courts to





favorite judicial issue. Throughout the
confirmation hearings of Justices Roberts
and Alito, Specter insisted that Roe v. Wade
had become a "super precedent" (even going
so far as to comically dub it a "super-duper
precedent") that should not be subject to
judicial reversal.
Reversal of Roe v. Wade would return
abortion to the state legislatures--and would
likely also make it an issue of political
debate at the federal level. Throughout his
tenure in the Senate, Specter has fought to
keep that political mess in the courts.
Although he now cloaks his argument in the
rhetoric of respect for prior judicial
decisions, Specter's stance on the abortion
issue was evident long before Roe became
anything resembling a "super-duper
precedent." The Washington Post reported
in March 1992, before Planned Parenthood
v. Casey upheld Roe, that Specter peppered
his primary campaign's stump speech with a
warning that abortion is the "most divisive
issue since slavery" and that, as the Post
summarized his remarks, it "has no place in
political campaigns."
If Specter had to take a strong legislative
position on abortion, his political fortunes
would not be assured in Pennsylvania. This
is the state where he struggled to beat back a
primary challenge from Pat Toomey in
2004, and where two pro-life candidates,
Republican Sen. Rick Santorum and pro-life
Democrat Bob Casey Jr., are fighting for the
other Senate seat. So long as Specter can
commit the issue to the courts, citing only
the neutral principle of stare decisis, his
political life is made significantly easier.
BUT SPECTER'S LOVE AFFAIR WITH
THE COURTS is not without its stormier
moments. Despite his stated position in the
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surveillance and abortion debates, Specter is
a fierce critic of the courts when they
contradict him on politically safe issues.
Ironically enough, this also manifested itself
in the same Roberts confirmation hearing
where Specter lauded Roe v. Wade's
precedential value.
In that hearing, Specter sharply rebuked the
Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez
and United States v. Morrison, which
limited Congress' ability to rely on the
Constitution's Commerce Clause to pass
regulations affecting purely intrastate
matters. These decisions infuriate Specter,
who insisted in the hearing that the Court
had belittled Congress' "method of
reasoning," and that the decisions
represented "the denigration by the court of
congressional authority." Right or wrong,
Specter seems to reject utterly the Court's
contention that Congress cannot be the judge
of its own power. If the Court overturned
Lopez and Morrison tomorrow, Specter
would shed not a tear, even through Lopez,
now 11 years old, is older than Roe was
when Specter began his Senate tenure in
1980.
Specter's eagerness to abandon his
commitment to judicial supremacy and stare
decisis isn't limited to the Commerce
Clause. In 1993 he co-sponsored the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
a bill explicitly passed to reverse the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the First
Amendment's free exercise clause in
Employment Division v. Smith. (Not
surprisingly, the high court struck down
RFRA, holding that Congress couldn't
overturn the Supreme Court's interpretations
of the Constitution.)
WHAT DISTINGUISHES THESE CASES
involving such seemingly disparate issues as
the Commerce Clause, presidential
authority, and the First Amendment? Why
does Specter defer to the courts on some
issues but not others?
It's possible that Specter's selective outrage
is driven by his policy preferences. He may
laud the judiciary when he likes its decisions
and castigate it when he disagrees. He
wouldn't be alone in this: Conservatives and
liberals alike are guilty of applauding
judicial supremacy when it serves their
policy interests and decrying it otherwise.
However, such selective outrage does not
entail a coherent philosophy. And Specter
perhaps best exemplifies the intellectual
confusion that can result.
But a more likely explanation is that Specter
defers to the Court on issues that are
politically explosive, while providing no
such deference on unquestionable political
winners. The Gun Free School Zones Act
(struck down in Lopez) and Violence
Against Women Act (struck down in
Morrison) aren't political risks for Specter at
the polls. Indeed, his continued ability to
trumpet his commitment to them is a boon.
Even RFRA was a political winner: It
passed the Senate by an overwhelming 97-3
margin.
However, eagerness to embrace
contradictory positions on these issues for
the purpose of political gain is a strategy
fraught with danger. It contributes to courts
becoming increasingly political bodies.
When politicians choose to punt issues to
the court out of fear of political controversy,
it shouldn't surprise them that in turn the
courts become more political, like a kind of
"superlegislature."
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Senator Specter is not afraid to read the
Constitution for himself where political
expedience permits. But on more explosive
issues like NSA surveillance and abortion,
he suddenly becomes a champion of the
judiciary. This inconsistency should give
rise to hard questions about Specter's
motivations, and the consequences of his
approach.
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Challenge; A veteran judge will rule on the legality of the NSA's warrantless anti-terror




An attempt to halt the National Security
Agency's controversial domestic
surveillance program generated intense legal
debate Monday before a veteran federal
judge, with opponents branding it a threat to
American citizens and defenders contending
it is legal and essential to national security.
The case is the first major legal challenge to
the warrantless wiretapping program, with
the Justice Department squaring off against
lawyers representing several groups and
individuals that seek to have the program
declared unconstitutional.
U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor, who
is expected to be the first to rule on the
issue, asked only one question during the
hearing and gave no indication of how she
would rule or when. It was the second
hearing she has held within a month on the
complex legal issues surrounding the
program.
Taylor has scheduled no further hearings,
and told the lawyers she would take the case
"under advisement," meaning that she would
weigh their arguments and issue a ruling.
After the program was revealed by the New
York Times, the government admitted that it
had launched a domestic wiretapping
initiative after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
NSA personnel listen in on phone calls and
obtain e-mails into and out of the U.S.
involving suspected terrorist affiliates. The
program bypasses the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, created after
government spying abuses in the 1970s, that
approves search and wiretapping warrants in
some intelligence and terrorismrelated
investigations.
In January, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Council on American-Islamic
Relations, Greenpeace and several
individuals, who expressed fear that the
government was spying on them, filed a
lawsuit here challenging the program. The
first hearing before Taylor was June 12.
Similar suits are pending in federal courts in
New York, Oregon and Texas but have had
no major hearings, and Taylor's decision
could be influential as other jurists consider
the issue.
The ACLU filed the suit in Detroit in part
because the area has a large Muslim
population. One of the plaintiffs Nazih
Hassan, of nearby Ypsilanti, is a member of
the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations
and has said he fears he has been a target of
eavesdropping because he frequently talks
with Muslims abroad.
Since the suit was filed, the government has
attempted to allay concerns of the area's
Arab Americans. Gen. Michael V. Hayden,
the former NSA chief who is now CIA
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director, has said the program is narrowly
tailored toward Al Qaeda and "is not a drift
net over Dearborn" or other towns with large
Muslim communities.
In court Monday, Justice Department
attorney Anthony J. Coppolino urged
Taylor, a longtime judge appointed to the
federal bench by President Carter, to throw
out the case on two grounds. None of the
plaintiffs had shown that they had suffered
injury and therefore they had no legal
standing to sue, he said, and that if Taylor
decided the plaintiffs had standing, the case
still should be dismissed because of the
"state secrets" doctrine.
The "state secrets" privilege, laid out in a
Supreme Court decision in 1953, prohibits
disclosure of information in legal
proceedings when there is "a reasonable
danger" that the evidence would "expose
military matters which, in the interest of
national security, should not be divulged."
That is clearly the issue in this instance,
Coppolino said, because the case involves a
challenge to an "ongoing program" of
surveillance against Al Qaeda that is integral
to the Bush administration's war on
terrorism.
He said President Bush had the authority to
launch the program after Sept. 11 because of
his inherent authority and because of the
authorization for use of military force issued
by Congress after those attacks.
Because of the program's nature, Coppolino
said, the government cannot disclose
whether it is conducting surveillance on any
of the plaintiffs, including the American-
Islamic group; James Bamford, author of
two books on the NSA; or Noel Saleh, a
Detroit lawyer frequently involved in civil
liberties cases. Coppolino said that if the
government revealed whether it was or was
not spying on a particular individual or
group it could harm the entire program.
Among rulings he cited to support
arguments was a 1978 decision by
federal appeals court in Washington
upheld the dismissal of a case alleging
the government had spied illegally






That decision said that by revealing whether
"internal communications" had or had not
been intercepted, "the individual himself and
any foreign organization with which he has
communicated would know what circuits
were used.
"Further," the court said, "any foreign
government or organization that has dealt
with a plaintiff whose communications are
known to have been acquired would at the
very least be alerted that its communications
might have been compromised or that it is a
target."
Coppolino said the government could not
"reveal even innocuous sounding
information" about the NSA surveillance
program because it might give Al Qaeda
insights into how the program was run,
putting the nation further at risk.
ACLU attorney Ann Beeson said the
government's position was so expansive that
it "would preclude judicial review in every
case where the president chose to ignore
Congress whenever he wants to wiretap
Americans."
She said government officials had revealed
sufficient information about the program
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that the judge could rule without further
fact-finding. That is crucial to the ACLU's
argument because it would give the judge an
opportunity to rule without delving into the
program's inner workings, avoiding the risk
of revelations government officials say
would harm the country.
Beeson said the June 29 Supreme Court
decision that Bush did not have the power to
set up special military trials at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, without the approval of
Congress should leave no doubt that there
were limits on presidential power in military
affairs. In that 5-3 decision, the high court
rejected Bush's claim that the commander in
chief can make the rules during an
unconventional war.
"It is hard to fathom how the subject matter
of this case could be a 'state secret,' " Beeson
said, given how much energy administration
officials have put into publicly defending it.
She said her clients, who include scholars,journalists and lawyers, had suffered "real
injuries" because the NSA program had
impeded their ability to do research, e-mail
people in foreign countries and engage in
other activities protected by the 1 st
Amendment. She said some attorneys
representing suspected terrorists had to
make "expensive trips" abroad because their
ability to communicate with people by
phone or computer had been impeded by the
surveillance program.
Outside court, Beeson said that she hoped
the judge would rule soon, and that she was
concerned that the government was invoking
the "state secrets" doctrine more and more.
"It was intended to be a shield" to protect a
limited amount of information and "they are
attempting to turn it into a sword" to scuttle
lawsuits challenging government power,
Beeson said.
Dawud Walid, executive director of the
Michigan chapter of the Council on
American-Islamic Relations, said he was
troubled that Bush administration officials
talked about exporting democracy but were
"trying to circumvent democratic processes"
at home.
Asked why government officials should
have to go to court to get a warrant before
wiretapping, Walid replied: "We have a
president, not a king."
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